I don't remember where I read it but dimly recall an article asserting that there was at least one case where our intelligence services mispredicted a major hostile capability development by 13 years! This entry by Austin Bay provides some beautiful illustration of the consequences of intel failures and diplomatic density:
Intel is never perfect and rarely certain. Those who argue it should be before acting are exemplars of Churchill's "unwisdom." Pathetic Neville Chamberlain waited for absolute proof of Hitler's perfidy. He got it -- Nazi blitzkrieg.
Smart enemies hide "proof," so intel analysts probe "indications" and make educated assessments. Analyses are bound to conflict. That doesn't make the mistaken analysis a lie.
Kay's report supports former U.N. Iraq inspector Rolf Ekeus' March 2000 assessment of Saddam's stockpile in Arms Control Today: "In my view, there are no large quantities of (chem and bio) weapons. ... Iraq has been aiming to keep the capability to start up production immediately. ..." He said Iraq saw the weapons "as tactical (battlefield) assets." In 2000, however, Ekeus hadn't seen 9-11. "Tactical" nerve weapons in terrorist hands are strategic weapons for gassing Manhattan -- and a practiced killer like Saddam certainly understood that.
The Bush administration had to end The Saddam War in order to defeat Al Qaeda at its root -- the Middle East's sick autocracies. The administration articulated this strategic rationale prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, though not often enough. However, to dismiss the tyrant's long-term intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction as no cause for toppling him is malignant "unwisdom." Sept. 11 necessarily reshaped all intel assessment, first with the freight of fear but ultimately with the weight of responsibility. After 9-11, Washington would have been unforgivably irresponsible to bet a million lives on a mass murderer's "good faith."
Churchill's history mentions German schemes to evade Treaty of Versailles sanctions. "Illegal" soldiers trained in secret programs to slip army manpower caps. The West caved on Versailles, and these troops quickly expanded the Wehrmacht.
When Hitler struck Poland, the "hidden men" were the core of his war machine.
[Emphasis added.] As Santayana said, those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it...
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