Saturday, January 08, 2005

How Long Will We Tolerate The Lies?

Today, Strategy Page shines its spotlight on the mess that is Syria:
January 7, 2005: Iraqi government officials, including the head of intelligence, are making a lot of noise about Syrian support for the anti-government forces. It's never been a secret that most of the anti-government activity was organized and funded by Iraqi Baath Party members. But the two main branches of the Baath Party have controlled both Iraq and Syria for nearly forty years. The Arabic word baath means “resurrection” or “renaissance.” The party had its origins in the desire of Syrian secular Arab nationalists to break with the medieval past and create a new form of government for Arab countries. The Baath Party was officially founded in 1947 and sought to create a secular and socialist culture in Arab countries. The Baath Party only caught on in Syria and, in 1954, Iraq. The Baath Party platform caught on, and in February, 1963, Baath took control in Iraq, and a month later in Syria. In Syria, Hafez al-Assad originally led the party. His son runs it, and Syria, today. In Iraq, Baath had trouble holding on to power. But by the late 1960s, Baath was in full control, and Saddam Hussein was running the party. That created a problem, however, as both Assad and Hussein insisted that their branch of the party was running the Baath movement. The two men could not agree on who was in charge, and became bitter enemies. For example, Syria sent troops to join the coalition assembled to oust Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, and has long supported any Iraqis that opposed Saddam (and Hussein returned the favor.)

But when Saddam was deposed in 2003, many senior Iraqi Baath Party members fled to Syria, and made peace with the Syrian branch of the party. This put the Syrian Baath Party in a tough position. Bashir Assad took over in Syria when his father died in 2000. Bashir was not groomed to run the country, but instead trained as a doctor. However, his older brother died in an accident, and it was up to Bashir to keep things together. This is not an easy job. Syria does not have Iraq's oil wealth, and the Syrian Baath Party is run by an even smaller minority (Alawite Moslems, 12 percent of the population) than was the case in Iraq (where Baath was run by Sunni Moslems, who were 20 percent of the population.) Worse yet, Al Qaeda considers Alawites just as heretical, and worthy of death, as the Shiites. To further complicate this situation, Syria has long been an ally of Shia Iran, mainly because Iran was a longtime enemy of Iraq.

The Syrian Baath party is in a very difficult situation. They became corrupt, as did the Iraqi Baath party, and turned into a police state. While not as brutal as Saddam's Baath, the Syrians were more effective. The elder Assad was not as eager to invade his neighbors (except for several failed attempts against Israel.) The Syrian Baath Party is thus less hated by Syrians than the Iraqi Baath Party was by Iraqis. But Syria is also full of unhappy citizens who would welcome a more honest and effective government. But like Arabs everywhere, most Syrians are either unwilling or unable to do the deed. And now the Syrian Baath Party sees, as its deadliest enemy, a democratic government in Iraq. Such an development could inspire Syrians to get rid of the Baath Party. Face it, being a dictator is like having a tiger-by-the-tail. It's tough to hold on, but letting go is fatal. So the Syrian Baath Party supports the remaining Iraqi Baath Party in their struggle to regain power in Iraq. But this is a dangerous game, especially as it becomes more and more difficult to deny Syrian support for Iraqi Baath violence inside Iraq. The Syrians try to have it both ways, by insisting that there is no support for Iraqi Baath, while having Syrian police and border guards look the other way as the Iraqis move money and people through Syrian into Iraq.

The Syrian Baath party also has things like loyalty (to fellow Baath members in Iraq) and greed (all that Iraqi oil money they are now getting) to worry about. They can't just tell the Iraqi Baath Party members to go away, despite American demands that they do just that. And then there is fear. A democratic Iraq will be an anti-Baath Iraq. Syria's only friend in the neighborhood is Iran. But even there, it is the minority of Islamic conservatives that dominate Iran, that supports Syria. The majority of Iranians see Syria as another oppressive police state, and an Arab one of that. Most Iranians have an ancient disdain for Arabs in general.

Syria, under the Baath Party, has no friends and few prospects. It cannot, or will not, turn on the Iraqi Baath Party, and, as a police state, certainly doesn't want an democracy next door. But Syria gains nothing by admitting any of this. It comes down to how long Iraq, and the coalition forces, will tolerate the lies.
Of the original axis of evil, now only Iran and North Korea remain. The problem is that it's become clear now that we can't get enough momentum in Iraq without dealing with some combination of Iran, Syria and the Saudis.

They have to make enough blood in Iraq to keep us distracted so that we don't move on to them. Of course the answer is that because they are doing this we MUST move on to them. The war never was about Iraq alone for heavens sake -- the war is entirely about solving the four color map problem in jarring the Muslim Middle East through an enlightenment. It may be near impossible without inflicting on them the level of damage we did on the Japanese -- the last relatively successful case of this sort of alien magnitude. But as with the Japanese, we wait for the sucker punch and then try to defeat them in a reasonable fashion. Don't forget that the Japanese were viewed as a freakishly alien culture prone to suicide death cults.

Of course, now the Japanese -- unlike France for instance -- really are one of our best allies.

But eventually, if we feel like we are headed toward losing or unable to gain a complete win then we will finally decide to do what it takes. Even if it takes the biggest intelligence failure of all time.

So who gets the next target on their back?

LGF has an update on Syria:
This is not just a story about Syria behaving as a rogue state; it is also a glaring example of the UN system failing. For UN Security Council membership from early 2002 through 2003 did not lead to more moderate Syrian behavior but rather to the exact opposite: a more defiant posture than was even witnessed during the years in which Hafiz al-Assad ruled Syria. And in December 2004, General George W. Casey, Jr., the U.S. commander in Iraq, has disclosed that the Iraqi insurgency was being run by former Iraqi Baath Party officials from Syria, itself. The current Iraqi leadership in Baghdad has suggested the involvement of the Syrian security services in the insurgency, as well. Indeed, US troops uncovered photographs of senior Syrian officials when they stormed insurgent strongholds in Falujah last November. A captured insurgent in Najaf told the Iraqi security authorities that he had gone through training camps in Syria. In short, Syrian fingerprints are all over the insurgency.

This latest deterioration in Syrian international behavior should not come as a complete surprise. For during those critical years in 2002 and 2003, Syria was promoted to sit on the UN Security Council without any pre-conditions. True Syria had been on the U.S. Department of State’s terrorism list since its inception in the late 1970s. But from the standpoint of the UN, Syria could sit on its most august body without having to modify its behavior in the least. What message did the Syrians internalize from this promotion in their international status? If the UN, from the Syrian standpoint, was the “source of international legitimacy,” then Syrian behavior was viewed in the morally-skewed universe of the UN as legitimate.

Amidst all the talk about UN reform, including the expansion of the UN Security Council from fifteen to twenty-four members, the story of Syria and terrorism is a sharp reminder that for the UN to have any positive influence in the future, its changes cannot be structural alone. The UN must demand minimal standards of behavior of its member states; if not, it risks becoming an entirely bankrupt idea. The original UN of President Roosevelt was born in 1945 in a moment of moral clarity, at which time new members had to declare war on one of the Axis powers. Unless that clarity is restored, the UN will not promote world order, but will inevitably turn into an instrument for global chaos instead.
The U.N. risks becoming an entirely bankrupt idea??? If it's possible to be more than bankrupt then the U.N. has managed it!

Anyway, the most interesting gating question about making Syria next is whether they actually do have any of Saddam's WMD. And while it's all over the headlines that Iran is going after nukes, there are also rumblings and hints about nuclear Saudis and Egyptians.

So what is it? Syria? Iran? Saudis? Egypt? Pakistan? Unfortunately, the answer is simply "yes".